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Abstract
In this paper we set up a NK-DSGE model in which the consumer
derives utility from a consumption basket made of public and private
consumption, there is monopolistic competiton in the intermediate
good sector, Calvo-Yun price setting, endogenous labour supply and
Taylor rule for monetary policy. We analyse the eﬀects of a counterci-
clical fiscal policy rule and how varying the degree of counterciclicality
aﬀects the determinacy of the rational expectations equilbrium and the
ability to respond to technological and government spending shocks. A
broad conclusion is that desiderability of pro/counter ciclical stance of
fiscal policy cannot accurately be drawn without taking into account
the quality of the public expenditure and the way it interacts with
private consumption.
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1 Introduction
The debate on fiscal policy rules and their interactions with monetary policy
is one of the most recent and vibrant field of research in modern macroeco-
nomics. On the theoretical side, the debate was triggered by the seminal
work of Leeper (1991) and continued by a huge and growing literature that
had its milestones in Woodford (1996,1998,2001), Benigno and Woodford
(2002) and many others. In the real world the most visible and important
application of this growing literature is the experience of the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was
designed to maintain fiscal discipline in the EMU and whose implementation
and reform are among the most pressing political and economic issues in the
institutional building of the European Union.
Generally speaking, fiscal discipline is a pre-condition for low interest
rate, to achieve permanent reduction of distorsionary taxation and, as the
literature on Fiscal Theory of the Price Level has recently emphasized1 , for
price stability. In a monetary union with decentralized fiscal framework2 ,
it’s necessary to prevent free-riding problems and to allow the conduct of
a common monetary policy .Since its introduction, and with an intensity
directly proportional to the diﬃculties to comply with its prescriptions, the
SGP has been charged with many allegations. While many of them seems
highly questionable (such as the proposals of the golden rule or exclusions of
some kind of public expenditure from the oﬃcial computations), and some
ambiguous (such as the medium term target of “close to balance”), some
others definitely need a closer look and more economic-based considerations.
More specifically, one of the main aims of the SGP was to provide
countries with the necessary and suﬃcient incentive to implement counter-
cyclical fiscal policies, possibly with a much-needed degree of automatism
and enforceability, given time-inconsistency problems (Chari and Kehoe,2003)
and political economy-related considerations (Alesina and Drazen,1991, Alesina
and Perotti,1995, Alesina, Perotti, Tavares 1998). Economic theory has in
fact achieved a widespread consensus on the beneficial eﬀects of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, insofar as it provides stabilization over the business
1Sims(1994), Cochrane (1999), Woodford (1995)
2An important, and often neglected, issue is that the need for fiscal policy rules arises
directly from the highly decentralized setting of EMU as far as fiscal issues are concerned
and the ultimate intergovernmental nature of the EU as a whole, aspects that give rise
to potential moral hazard problems. If the European integration goes further towards a
truly federal system, all this discussion on SGP would obviously be diﬀerent and even no
longer useful.
2
cycle, enables the economy to eﬀectively fight recessions, and it is consistent
with optimal tax-smoothing (Barro, 1979). According to many observers,
one of the main problems regards the insuﬃcient eﬀort the Pact produces
in order to avoid asymmetry and procyclical bias in the conduct of national
fiscal policies: it does not ensure fiscal consolidation during good times and
induces pro-cyclical adjustments during an economic downturn or, at least,
it does not seem to do the job in a symmetric way. Accusation of tendence
to procylicality is made by Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) and confirmed by
Orbàn and Szapàrt (2004), and also by Buti, Eijﬃnger,Franco (2003), Bal-
assone, Monacelli (2000),at least for the lack of automatism during “good
times”.
So the literature and the policy-making has achieved a widespread con-
sensus on the importance of counter-ciclicality in fiscal policy practice; this
paper is concerned with the insertion of this feature into the standard
New Keynesian General Equilibrium framework and the analysis of how
it changes the stability of rational expectations equilibrium, its sensibility
to variations in policy rule and structural parameters, and the ability to
respond to stochastic shocks.
The theoretical methodology we used is the adoption of a counterciclical
dynamics for government expenditure into a fairly standard New Keyne-
sian general equilibrium model, with monopolistic competition, Calvo-Yun
pricing, endogenous labour supply, Taylor rule for monetary policy and the
insertion of useful government expenditure. The latter is one the three main
approaches that are being used in order to break the Ricardian equivalence
(which would deliver virtually no eﬀect of fiscal policy on real variables),
so to replicate with general equilibrium models the main empirical regular-
ities concerning government variables; the other two approaches are finite
horizon (or overlapping generations) models, and rule of thumb-agents (or
credit constrained) models. This paper chooses to concentrate on the useful
government expenditure approach, in line with contributions such as Garelli
(2001), Bouakez, Rebei (2003), Gali, Monacelli (2005), ; our methodology
implies the use of a consumption basket made of a CES aggregate of public
and private consumption. This allows us to analyse the properties of the
model and our results for a diﬀerent combination of preferences parameters
leading alternatively to complementarity or substitutability between public
and private consumption. Our main conclusion is that we cannot properly
assess the desiderability of prociclical or counterciclical fiscal policy without
making reference to the way public expenditure interacts with private con-
sumption. That is, without considering a more appropriate disaggregation
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of government expenditure along diﬀerent categories which have diﬀerent
impact on economic variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
set up, section 3 deals with the resulting system of equations in which the
economy collapses and the issue of complementarity / substitutability be-
tween public and private consumption; section 4 is concerned with stability
analysis, section 5 with impulse response. Section 6 concludes and lays the
foundation for future research work.
2 The model
2.1 Households and the demand-side
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals,
whose measure is normalized to unity. Each of them consumes a consump-
tion basket C˜tand supplies labour Nt to a continuum of monopolistically-
competitive intermediate firms. Wealth is allocated into one-period bonds
(Bt).
The instantaneous utility function amounts to be:
Ut =
C˜1−γt
1− γ −
an
1 + γn
N1+γnt (1)
The consumption basket is a mix of public and private consumption:
C˜t =
∙
θC
υ−1
v
t + (1− θ)G
v−1
v
t
¸ v
v−1
(2)
The representative household choose
h
Ct+i, Nt+i,
Bt+i
Pt+i
i∞
i=0
to solve:
maxEt
∞X
i=0
βiUt+i (3)
subject to the budget constraint:
Ct =
Wt
Pt
Nt +Πt − Tt −
³
1
it
´
Bt −Bt−1
Pt
(4)
with:
Πt= real-profits from the firms
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Tt= lump-sum taxes
it= nominal interest rate
γ, γm, γn > 0
Fisher-parity holds:
Rt+1 = itEt
µ
Pt
Pt+1
¶
(5)
with Rt+1being the real interest rate.
Bellman equation is:
V
µ
Bt−1
Pt
¶
= max
∙
Ut + βEtV
µ
Bt
Pt+1
¶¸
(6)
First order conditions with respect to consumption:
Ct+1
Ct
= (βEtRt+1)
ν
Ã
C˜t+1
C˜t
!1−γν
(7)
First order condition with respect to labour supply:
Wt
Pt
C˜−γt = anN
γn
t (8)
Loglinearizing equation(7):
ct = −νrt+1 + (1− γν)c˜t − (1− γν)Etc˜t+1 +Etct+1 (9)
Loglinearizing (2):
c˜t = θ
µ
C
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
ct + (1− θ)
µ
G
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
gt (10)
shifting one period-forward:
Etc˜t+1 = θ
µ
C
C˜
¶ν−1
ν
Etct+1 + (1− θ)
µ
G
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
Etgt+1 (11)
Plugging (10) and (11) into (9) I get:
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ct = −
ν∙
1− (1− γν)θ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν
¸rt+1−
∙
(1− γν)(1− θ)
³
G
C˜
´ ν−1
ν
¸
∙
1− (1− γν)θ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν
¸ (Etgt+1 − gt)+Etct+1
(12)
(12) is the Euler equation for this case.
Defining:
ν%
1−(1−γν)θ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν
& = Φ
%
(1−γν)(1−θ)

G
C˜
 ν−1
ν
&
%
1−(1−γν)θ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν
& = Ω
ct = −Φrt+1 − Ω(Etgt+1 − gt) +Etct+1 (13)
Aggregate resource constraint is:
Y = C +G
Log-linearization leads to:
yt =
C¯
Y¯
ct +
G¯
Y¯
gt (14)
and
Etct+1 =
Y
C
Etyt+1 −
G
C
Etgt+1 (15)
Putting (13) and (15) into (14):
yt = −
C¯
Y¯
Φrt+1 +Etyt+1 +
∙
G¯+ C¯ Ω
Y¯
¸
[gt −Etgt+1] (16)
(16) is the IS curve of this economy.
2.2 Firms and the supply-side
There are two kind of firms: final goods producers and intermediate goods
producers.
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2.2.1 Final goods producers
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive firms producing an homo-
geneous good Ytusing intermediate goods, since there are a continuum of
intermediate goods producers of measure unity, each producing a diﬀerenti-
ated input for final goods production. Let Yt(f) being the input produced by
intermediate goods firm f and z the types available; the production function
that transforms intermediate goods into final output is:
Yt =
∙Z 1
0
Y ft (z)
ε−1
ε dz
¸ ε
ε−1
(17)
with ε > 1 being the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods. We can see that this CES production function exhibits diminish-
ing marginal product, a property that will drive the firms to diversify and
produce all the intermediate goods available.
The final good producer will minimize its cost; therefore it will choose
Y ft (z) to:
min
Z 1
0
Pt(z)Y
f
t (z)dz (18)
subject to the production function (17).
The Langrangian results into:
L =
Z 1
0
Pt(z)Y
f
t (z)dz − λ
∙Z 1
0
Y ft (z)
ε−1
ε dz
¸ ε
ε−1
(19)
The first order condition with respect to Y ft (z) is:
Pt(z) = λ
Ã
Y ft (z)
Y ft
!− 1ε
(20)
To proceed now we need to solve for the Lagrange multiplier; to do
so, following Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999), we re-write the FOC of this
maximization problem in a diﬀerent way, looking at the Langrangian:
Pt(z) = λ
δY ft
δY ft (z)
(21)
Multiplying both sides for the term Y
f
t (z)
Y ft
we obtain:
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1Y ft
Pt(z)Y
f
t (z) = λ
δY ft
δY ft (z)
Y ft (z)
Y ft
(22)
Integrating through:
1
Y ft
Z 1
0
Pt(z)Y
f
t (z)dz = λ
Z 1
0
δY ft
δY ft (z)
Y ft (z)
Y ft
dz (23)
Considering that:R 1
0 Pt(z)Y
f
t (z)dz = total cost of production =EtR 1
0
δY ft
δY ft (z)
Y ft (z)
Y ft
dz = 1
then (23) becomes:
Et
Y ft
= λ (24)
Since the final goods firms operate in perfect competition, total cost of
production must be equal to the total value of goods sold:
Et = PtY
f
t (25)
Se we can combine to get:
Pt = λ (26)
Plugging (26) into (20)
Pt(z) = Pt
Ã
Y ft (z)
Y ft
!− 1ε
(27)
Y ft (z) =
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−ε
Y ft (28)
Integrating over all final good firms we can obtain the total demand of
intermediate good z:
Yt(z) =
Z 1
0
Y ft (z)df (29)
Plugging (28) into (29):
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Yt(z) =
Z 1
0
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−ε
Y ft df (30)
Yt(z) =
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−ε Z 1
0
Y ft df (31)
As
R 1
0 Y
f
t df = Yt (the sum of single firms output gives the total output
of the sector)
we are finally able to obtain the following total demand curve for inter-
mediate good z
Yt(z) =
µ
Pt(z)
Pt
¶−ε
Yt (32)
If we plug it into the production function of firm f we obtain, after a
few algebrical manipulations, an expressions for the aggregate price index:
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
Pt(z)
1
1−εdz
¸ 1
1−ε
(33)
2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods firms are monopolistically competitive and have the fol-
lowing standard constant-return-to-scale production function, with Atbeing
the technological parameter following a stationary process.
Yt(f) = AtNt (34)
and set prices on a Calvo-Yun based staggered framework, with (1− ζ)
being the probability that each period the firm adjusts its price, and ζ being
obviously the probability that it keeps prices constant. The adjustment
probability is independent across time and across firms, and the average
number of periods a price remain fixed is given by 11−ζ . Technology follows
a standard AR(1) process.
Intermediate firms maximize expected discounted profits subject to the
production function (34) and the demand curve they face (32); in the flexible-
prices equilibrium the maximization problem leads to the usual condition:
MCt =
1
1 + µ
(35)
with 11+µ =
ε
1−εbeing the mark-up, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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With sticky prices, the relevant maximization problem for the firm be-
comes:
max
i=∞X
i=0
(ζβ)iEtΛt,i
∙
Pt(f)−MCnt+i(f)
Pt+i
Yt,t+i(f)
¸
(36)
with:
MCnt (f) = PtMCt(f) = nominal marginal cost
Λt,i =
³
Ct+i
Ct
´−γ
=stochastic discount factor
subject to (32) and (34).
Plugging the constraints into the objective function and recalling the
condition coming from cost minimization3:
W
P
A
=MC (37)
we get the optimal price:
P ∗t = (1 + µ)
i=∞X
i=0
ϑt,iMCnt+1 (38)
with:
ϑt,i = f(Λt,i, Yt+i)
that is, the optimal price equals the steady-state mark-up times a weighted
average of expected future nominal marginal costs; the weights depend on
how much the firm discounts future cash flows in each period t+ i (taking
into account that prices remain fixed along the way) and on the revenue
expected in each period.
Considering also that the aggregate price index is a combination of price
charged by those firms who get to change their prices and those who do not:
Pt =
£
ζP 1−εt + (1− ζ)P ∗1−εt
¤ 1
1−ε (39)
3This condition comes from the simple cost minimization problem in a no-capital sit-
uation with constant return to scale technology: min W/PN subject to AN − Y = 0 and
remembering that the Langrange multiplier, being the derivative of total cost with re-
spect to Y, is the real marginal cost MC.
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2.3 Potential output
Let us start by looking for an equilibrium on the labour market. This
has to imply that firms’wage decisions based on cost minimization problem
must be equal to the wage decision by households based on their optimizing
behaviour. From the firms’point of view we have the usual condition coming
from cost minimization:
Wt
Pt
At
=MCt (40)
which, combined with the steady-state expression for marginal cost (35)
becomes:
Wt
Pt
=
At
1 + µ
(41)
Combining with households’optimal labour supply (8):
At
1 + µ
= an
Nγnt
C˜−γt
(42)
using the production function (34), after few simple algebrical manipu-
lations:
Yt = A
1+γn
γn
t a
− 1γn
n (1 + µ)
− 1γn C˜−
γ
γn (43)
which is, in level, the supply function of our economy.
Solving for the steady-state mark-up:
(1 + µ) = Y −γnt A
γn+1
t C˜
−γ
t a
−1
n (44)
Loglinearizing it:
µt = (γn + 1)at − γ c˜t − γnyt (45)
Using the loglinearized basket of consumption (10)and the loglinearized
resource constraint (14):
µt = (γn+1)at−γ
"
θ
µ
C¯
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
∙
Y¯
C¯
yt −
G¯
C¯
gt
¸
+ (1− θ)
µ
G¯
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
gt
#
−γnyt
(46)
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To find an expression for potential output let us set µ = 0 (since at
Y ∗log-deviations from steady state mark up are equal to zero) and solve for
y∗t :
y∗t =
γn + 1
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯ + γn
at +
∙
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν G¯
C¯ − γ(1− θ)
³
G
C˜
´ ν−1
ν
¸
µ
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯ + γn
¶ gt (47)
Equation (47)is the expression for potential output in log-deviations from
the steady-state. The coeﬃcient on gt, indicating the positive eﬀect of fiscal
policy on potential output, may cause some concern regarding its plausi-
bility; nevertheless, as we will show in the next sections, with the parame-
trization we used the above coeﬃcient will endogenously turn out to have
second-order eﬀect, as its value is very close to zero.
2.4 New Keynesian Phillips Curve
In order to get the New Keynesian Phillips curve, let us solve (47) for atand
plug it back into (46):
µ =
"
γθ
µ
C
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
#
(y∗t − yt)
Considering the loglinearization of the mark-up (35) :
µ = −mc (48)
mc =
"
γθ
µ
C
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
#
(yt − y∗t ) (49)
If we go back to the firm sector and plug the expression for optimal price
P ∗t (equation 38) into the aggregate price index (equation 39), after some
long but standard algebra and dropping all the terms involving a product
of two or more variables in log-deviation from the steady-state4, we get to
the standard formulation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
4That is because we are not interested in second-order terms.
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πt =
∙
(1− ζ) (1− βζ)
θ
¸
mct + βEtπt+1 (50)
Plugging 49:
πt =
∙
(1− ζ) (1− βζ)
θ
¸"
γθ
µ
C
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
#
(yt − y∗t ) + βEtπt+1 (51)
Renaming the parameters according to:h
(1−ζ)(1−βζ)
ζ
i
= λ component depending on probability of price
adjustment∙
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
¸
= δ component depending on preferences
parameters
λδ = k
we have the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, microfounded just
as we find in Woodford (2003):
πt = k(yt − y∗t ) + βEtπt+1 (52)
2.5 Monetary policy rule
As for monetary policy, we skip the usual derivations stemming from most
studies on optimal monetary policy, and we assume (in line with the whole
literature) a Taylor-like monetary policy rule for the evolution of the nominal
interest rate:
it = φππt + φx(yt − y∗t ) (53)
where obviously interest rate responds to movements in current inflation
and current output gap.
We thus are ready to express the equations of our economy in a full-
system.
2.6 Fiscal policy rule
I need a fiscal rule to close it. A wide literature (and well-known pol-
icy debate, concerning especially the European Union and the Stability
and Growth Pact) emphasizes the importance for governments to stick to
counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy regimes, in order to stabilize output over
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the cycle, smooth taxation and let automatic stabilizers work properly and
eﬀectively.Lately, this issue has gained particular importance in international
organization (such as ECB, OECD, IMF) policy reccomandations. Follow-
ing this approach,we assume that government applies a counter-cyclical log-
linear fiscal policy rule of the kind:
Gt
G¯
=
µ
Yt
Y ∗
¶−α
(54)
where α is the parameter determining the intensity of the countercicli-
cality of the fiscal policy rule.
Loglinearization of (54) leads to:
gt = −α(yt − y∗t ) (55)
3 The system of equations
The economy is described by the system of equations (47),(52),(53),(16),(55)
In matrix form:
Et
∙
yt+1
πt+1
¸
=
"(
1 + c1(βφx+κ)β(1−αb2+c2α)
c1(βφπ−1)(1−αb2)
β(1−αb2+c2α)
−κ
β(1−αb2) β
−1
)# ∙
yt
πt
¸
+
" −c1b1(βφx+κ)−βαc2b1
β(1−αb2+c2α)
κb1
β(1−αb2)
# £
at
¤
with the parameters:
γn+1
γθ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+γn
= b1
%
γθ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν G¯
C¯
−γ(1−θ)

G
C˜
 ν−1
ν
&
#
γθ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+γn
$ = b2
C¯
Y¯ Φ =
C¯
Y¯
ν%
1−(1−γν)θ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν
& = c1
h
G¯+C¯ Ω
Y¯
i
= G¯
Y¯
+ C¯
Y¯
%
(1−γν)(1−θ)

G
C˜
 ν−1
ν
&
%
1−(1−γν)θ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν
& = c2
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3.1 Complementarity / substitutability
Take again (1):
Ut =
"∙
θC
υ−1
v
t + (1− θ)G
v−1
v
t
¸ v
v−1
#1−γ
1− γ −
an
1 + γn
N1+γnt
Considering the basket (2):
C˜t =
∙
θC
υ−1
v
t + (1− θ)G
v−1
v
t
¸ v
v−1
Let us calculate the marginal utility of private consumption:
∂U
∂Ct
= θC
− 1ν
t C˜
−γ+ 1ν
t (56)
Loglinearizing:
θC
− 1ν
t C˜
−γ+ 1ν
t (1 +−
1
ν
ct + (
1
ν
− γ)c˜t) (57)
Plugging the loglinearized basket (10), after few algebrical manipula-
tions:
θ
µ
C
C˜
¶− 1ν
C˜−γ − θ
µ
C
C˜
¶− 1ν
C˜−γ
"
1
υ
− θ
µ
C
C˜
¶− 1ν+1
(
1
ν
− γ)
#
ct +(58)
+θ
µ
C
C˜
¶− 1ν
C˜−γ
µ
1
ν
− γ
¶
(1− θ)
µ
G
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
gt
Let us study the sign of the coeﬃcient on gt :
sign θ
µ
C
C˜
¶− 1ν
C˜−γ(
1
ν
− γ)(1− θ)
µ
G
C˜
¶ ν−1
ν
= sign
µ
1
ν
− γ
¶
If 1ν − γ > 0
1
ν > γ
ν < 1γ or, in the terminology below, v < σ
then private and public consumption are complements, because increas-
ing gt increases the marginal utility of private consumption.
So now I have a benchmark for the calibration; whenever the value for ν
is lower than 1γ I have complementarity, and the wider the gap the greater
the complementarity.
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4 Simulations
Here is the list of fixed parameters for calibration:⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
inverse of labour supply elast. γn 1.5
gov.consumption to GDP G¯Y¯ 0.25
priv.consumption to GDP C¯Y¯ 0.75
GDP to gov.cons. Y¯G¯ 4
GDP to priv.cons. Y¯
C¯
1.34
public to private cons. G¯C¯ 0.33
output coeﬀ. Taylor rule φx 0.5
output coeﬀ. Phillips curve κ 0.043
weight in the basket θ 0.75
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
The degree of complementarity / substitutability between public and pri-
vate consumption depends on the sign and magnitude of 1ν − γ; we conduct
several experiments by varying those two parameters, thereby checking the
range of fiscal policy parameters consistent with stability of rational expec-
tations equilibrium. With the variation of ν, also the ratio of private/public
consumption and the basket of consumption (C
C˜
,G
C˜
) vary accordingly.5 Note
that, in all the below experiments, the coeﬃcient b2 (indicating the positive
eﬀect of government expenditure on potential output level) is close to 0.01.
In the following experiments, we vary the coeﬃcient of monetary policy
on inflation (φπ) (simulating the standard case, the aggressive case, the very
aggressive case, and the loose case), for diﬀerent values of the elasticity of
substitution between C and G (ν) and the risk adversion parameter (γ):
4.1 Complementarity
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
BENCH 0.5 1.5 1.5 −1 < α < 3
case1 0.5 1.5 2.5 −1 < α < 3
case2 0.5 1.5 0.7 never
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
The inclusion of fiscal policy does not seem to modify the Taylor prin-
ciple: the coeﬃcient on inflation, still needs to be greater than one for the
equilibrium to be determinate. On the other hand, even when monetary
policy is aggressive, the range of parameters consistent with stability calls
for counterciclicality (or moderate prociclicality).
5Since they are function of θ and ν, so whenever we vary the elasticity of substitution
we also have to change those ratios.
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Increasing the degree of complementarity by lowering the risk adversion
parameter does not seem to change anything in terms of determinacy.⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case3 0.25 1.5 1.5 −1 < α < 3
case4 0.25 1.5 2.5 −1 < α < 3
case5 0.25 1.5 0.7 never
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
Increasing the degree of complementarity by lowering the elasticity of
substitution:⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case6 0.5 0.9 1.5 −1 < α < 3
case7 0.5 0.9 2.5 −1 < α < 3
case8 0.5 0.9 0.7 never
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
Moving both, so further widening the degree of complementarity:⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case9 0.25 0.9 1.5 −1 < α < 3
case10 0.25 0.9 2.5 −1 < α < 3
case11 0.25 0.9 0.7 never
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
So far we have seen what happens to determinacy in case public and
private consumption are complements in the utility function; determinacy
is ensured for all the values of fiscal policy parameter leading to counter-
ciclicality, and for a limited prociclical response. This result holds if we
wide the degree of complementarity, lowering the risk adversion parameter
and/or the elasticity of substitution. Let us see what happens now if we
induce substitutability.
4.2 Substitutability
Let us start by raising γ above 1, (so that ν > 1γ ), giving it a large value
that is often assigned in some of the literature:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case12 13 1.5 1.5 −2 < α < 3
case13 13 1.5 2.5 −2 < α < 3
case14 13 1.5 0.7 never
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
If I induce substitutability by keeping γconstant and raising ν:⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case18 0.5 3 1.5 −1.5 < α < 3
case19 0.5 4 1.5 −1.8 < α < 3
case20 0.5 5 1.5 −2 < α < 3
case21 0.5 9 1.5 always
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
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Increasing the degree of substitutability by raising the elasticity of sub-
stitution makes prociclical fiscal policy also determinate; equivalently, in-
creasing complementarity (=decreasing substitutability) makes only coun-
terciclical f.p. determinate. The same result is obtained, although in a much
slower pace, by raising γ, as the previous table shows.
Let’see if this results holds also with diﬀerent monetary policy stance.⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
TITLE γ v φπ STABILITY PARAMETERS
case22 0.5 3 2.5 −1.5 < α < 3
case23 0.5 4 2.5 −1.8 < α < 3
case24 0.5 5 2.5 −2 < α < 3
case25 0.5 9 2.5 −2.5 < α < 3
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
And with passive monetary policy, it is never determinate, no matter
how substitute Gand C are.
The main conclusion we can draw is that increasing the substitutabil-
ity between public and private consumption (no matter the source of that
increase) allows for stability of prociclical fiscal policy, in addition to coun-
terciclical, which is the only stability rule in case of complementarity. The
intuition behind this result is that if government expenditure is prociclical,
namely it is directly proportional to the dynamics of actual output, the in-
flationary pressure is dumped by the optimizing behaviour of consumers,
who endogenously decrease private consumption in response to an increase
in public consumption (because of the complementarity in the utility func-
tion).
5 Response to shocks
5.1 Technological shocks
Let us now analyze the way α aﬀects the optimal response to technological
shocks.
Re-write the system so that:
Etyt+1 =
µ
1 +
βc1φx + κc1
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
yt +
µ
c1(βφπ − 1)(1− αb2)
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
πt +
µ
−c1b1(βφx + κ)− βαc2b
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
Etπt+1 = −
κ
β(1− αb2)
yt + β−1πt +
κb1
β(1− αb2)
at
at = ρat−1 + εat
with εat ∼ (0, σ2)
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In matrix form:
AEtyt+1 = Byt + Cxt
is:⎧
⎨
⎩
1 0 −a3
0 1 −b3
0 0 1
⎫
⎬
⎭Et
⎧
⎨
⎩
yt+1
πt+1
at
⎫
⎬
⎭ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a1 a2 0
b1 b2 0
0 0 ρ
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎧
⎨
⎩
yt
πt
at−1
⎫
⎬
⎭+
⎧
⎨
⎩
0
0
1
⎫
⎬
⎭ ε
a
t
5.1.1 Complementarity
Let us start from the benchmark case, in which the risk adversion coeﬃcient
(γ)is set at 0.5 and the elasticity of substitution between private and public
consumption (v)is set at 1.5. So, following the derived rule of thumb v Q 1γ ,
we have complementarity. Here are the results, for diﬀerent values of the
fiscal policy pararamer α :
FIGURE 1 HERE
The counterciclical case (upper panel) shows us that the more counter-
ciclical fiscal policy is, the greater the impact on output; persistance of the
shocks, however, is always the same. On the other hand, inflation response
increases with counterciclicality. Prociclicality (lower panel) is good for in-
flation, which decreases (the more prociclical fiscal policy is the greater the
reduction), but not good for output, whose response is very small and de-
creases with the degree of prociclicality. Obviously, the inflationary bias is
reduced the more aggressive monetary policy becomes, but at expense of
the output response (which is reduced).
Let us see what happens when we vary the degree of substitutability/
complementarity between public and private consumption.
Let us widen the degree of complementarity by lowering v to 0.9:
FIGURE 2 HERE
We can see that increasing the degree of complementarity between pri-
vate and public consumption increases the response of output and inflation
to the technological shock; this eﬀect is greater the more counterciclical fis-
cal policy is. We do not show it here, but the same results are obtained if the
increase in complementarity comes from an decrease in the risk adversion
coeﬃcient γ instead of v.
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5.1.2 Substitutability
Let us induce substitutabilty by raising the elasticity of substitution ν to 9 :
FIGURE 3 HERE
Response of output and inflation is lower (with respect to the comple-
mentarity case), but still the role of counterciclical fiscal policy is preserved:
the greater α, the greater the response of output and inflation.
We can then conclude that counterciclical fiscal policy enhances the re-
sponse of output and inflation to technological shocks; in particular, the
more counterciclical it is, the bigger the eﬀect. If private and public con-
sumption are complements, these eﬀects are further increased; if they are
substitutes, the signs of the eﬀects are the same, but of much lower mag-
nitude. Prociclical fiscal policy has a much lower positive eﬀect on output,
and a negative eﬀect on inflation.
5.2 Government expenditure shocks
This section analyses what happens in case of shocks to the fiscal policy rule;
in order to do so, we add a i.i.d. shock εgt to equation (55), so to capture
all the deviations from rationality that policy-makers might be induced to,
due for example to political or lobbying pressures. We also have to re-write
the system in a 7X7 form (see Appendix B).
Here are the results in the standard case:
FIGURE 4 HERE
As we can see, both in case of counterciclicality and prociclicality we have
approximately the same eﬀect: the immediate impact is a substantial raise
in the output gap, due to the fact that actual output reacts to government
expenditure shock much more intensively than potential; then the resulting
inflationary pressure brings down output gap , and the whole movement is
absorbed within a couple of periods. The only significant diﬀerence is the
dynamics of public expenditure: in case of counterciclicality, its jump is
obviously smaller than the prociclical case, and it is reduced as the degree
of counterciclicality increase (the opposite happens in the prociclical case).
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Here are the results for a stronger degree of complementarity (obtained
by lowering γ to 0.25 and v to 0.6):
FIGURE 5 HERE
As we can see, under counterciclical regime increasing complementarity
raises the response of actual output and reduces the dynamic of government
expenditure (since the complementary increase in private consumption in-
creases output which in turn, under a counterciclical fiscal policy rule, re-
duces public expenditure). Under prociclical regime, on the other hand,
actual output’s response is enhanced (for the same reason), but government
expenditure response is more and more severe.
What happens in case of substitutability?
Intuitively, output will react less, since the innovation in public expen-
diture is now matched by a decrease in private consumption, which in turn
dumpens the output’s reaction. This will also be reflected in a smoother
jump of public expenditure as we increase the absolute value of α, both
under prociclical and counterciclical regime. These the results (for v = 9):
FIGURE 6 HERE
6 Conclusions
This paper is concerned with a more detailed analysis on when counter-
ciclical fiscal policy rule (lately recommended by most observers) is actually
desirable. We presented a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model with government expenditure entering the utility function of
the representative household through the consumption basket and a fiscal
policy rule depending on output gap. Our results can be summarized as
follows.
As far as stability properties are concerned, the modified set up delivers
stability of rational expectation equilibrium mainly for parameters show-
ing counterciclicality of fiscal policy rule. However, increasing the degree of
substitutability between private and public consumption, delivers stability
also for values of fiscal policy rule consistent with a prociclical stance, be-
cause optimizing behaviour of agents (who decrease private consumption in
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response to a government expenditure shock because of complementarity)
takes care of dumpening the resulting inflationary bias of fiscal policy.
As far as response to stochastic shocks, we showed that counterciclical
fiscal policy amplifies the eﬀects on output (but also on inflation), and this
eﬀect is bigger the wider is the degree of complementarity between public and
private consumption; prociclical fiscal policy, on the other hand, is better for
inflation but reduces considerably the positive eﬀect of technological shock
on output. On the other hand, under substitutability between private and
public consumption, responses are qualitatively the same, but quantitatively
much less significant.
We also analysed the eﬀects of government expenditure shocks, conclud-
ing that a positive fiscal policy shocks impacts more on actual output under
complementarity, as perfectly intuitive; in this case, counterciclical fiscal pol-
icy helps to dumpen the subsequent response of public expenditure (which
follows output), whereas a prociclical stance increases the amplitude of the
initial fluctuations. Also in this case, substitutability lowers the response of
economic variables, including public expenditure. It seems therefore that ef-
fects on government deficit of an unexpected increase in public expenditure
(captured by fiscal policy shock) are themselves depending on the relation-
ship between private and public consumption: in case of complementarity,
eﬀects on deficits can be very severe if policy makers are tempted by proci-
clical stance; on the other hand, under substitutability, they trade a lower
eﬀect on deficit with a lower response of output.
The main result of this paper is that it really seems to make little sense to
discuss prociclicality or countericlicality of fiscal policy without distinguish
between the diﬀerent categories of the government expenditure, and their
properties.For example, government expenditure on a public good (which is
complementary to private consumption) is consistent with counter-ciclical
fiscal policy and amplifies the response of output to technological and fiscal
shocks; on the other hand, financing a merit good (which seems to be fea-
tured by substitutability) delivers stability under a prociclical stance, and
helps smoothing the response of economic variables to stochastic shocks.
Following these results, future extensions include a more realistic analy-
sis of fiscal policy, both on the revenue side (inserting distorsionary taxation
on labour, capital and consumption) and on the expenditure side (disag-
gregating government consumption in a more detailed fashion), in line with
contributions such as Fiorito, Kollintzas (2004), Forni, Monteforte, Sessa
(2006) and Lopez-Salido, Rabanal (2006).
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8 Tables of figures
FIGURE 1: response to technological shock in the standard case
FIGURE 2: response to technological shock increasing complementarity
FIGURE 3: response to technological shock increasing substitutability
FIGURE 4: response to government expenditure shock in the standard
case
FIGURE 5: response to gov.exp. shock increasing complementarity
FIGURE 6: response to gov.exp shock increasing substitutability
9 Appendix A
Then the system is:
y∗t = b1at + b2gt (59)
πt = k(yt − y∗t ) + βEtπt+1 (60)
it = φππt + φx(yt − y∗t ) (61)
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yt = −c1(it −Etπt+1) +Etyt+1 + c2 [gt −Etgt+1] (62)
gt = −α(yt − y∗t ) (63)
10 First equation
Update (63):
Etgt+1 = −αEtyt+1 + αEty∗t+1
We know from (59) that:
Ety
∗
t+1 = b2Etgt+1
since Etat+1 = 0
Plugging in:
Etgt+1 = −αEtyt+1 + αb2Etgt+1
(1− αb2)Etgt+1 = −αEtyt+1
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Etgt+1 =
−α
(1− αb2)
Etyt+1 (64)
Let us put (63) into (59):
y∗t = b1at + b2[−α(yt − y∗t )]
y∗t = b1at − αb2yt + αb2y∗t
(1− αb2)y∗t = b1at − αb2yt
y∗t =
b1
(1− αb2)
at −
αb2
1− αb2
yt (65)
Let us now plug (61),(63), and (64) into (62):
yt = −c1it + c1Etπt+1 +Etyt+1 + c2gt − c2Etgt+1
yt = −c1 [φππt + φx(yt − y∗t )] + c1Etπt+1 + Etyt+1 + c2[−α(yt − y∗t )] −
c2[ −α(1−αb2)Etyt+1]
yt = −c1φππt − c1φx(yt − y∗t ) + c1Etπt+1 + Etyt+1 − αc2(yt − y∗t ) +
c2α
(1−αb2)Etyt+1
yt = −c1φππt − c1φxyt + c1φxy∗t + c1Etπt+1 +Etyt+1 − αc2yt + αc2y∗t +
c2α
(1−αb2)Etyt+1
(1 + c2α(1−αb2))Etyt+1 = (1 + c1φx + αc2)yt − (c1φx + αc2)y
∗
t + c1φππt −
c1Etπt+1
Plug (65) in: (looking only at (c1φx + αc2)y
∗
t ) :
(c1φx + αc2)y
∗
t = (c1φx + αc2)
∙
b1
(1− αb2)
at −
αb2
1− αb2
yt
¸
=
c1φxb1
1− αb2
at −
c1φxαb2
1− αb2
yt +
αc2b1
1− αb2
at −
α2c2b2
1− αb2
yt
=
c1φxb1 + αc2b1
1− αb2
at −
c1φxαb2 + α
2c2b2
1− αb2
yt
So the whole thing becomes:³
1−αb2+c2α
1−αb2
´
Etyt+1 =
³
(1−αb2)(1+c1φx+αc2)+c1φxαb2+α2c2b2
1−αb2
´
yt+ c1φππt−
c1φxb1+αc2b1
1−αb2 at − c1Etπt+1
Focus on c1Etπt+1 :
considering (60):
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c1Etπt+1 =
c1πt − c1k(yt − y∗t )
β
=
c1πt
β
+
−κc1yt + κc1y∗t
β
=
c1πt
β
+
−κc1yt
β
+
κc1
β
∙
b1
(1− αb2)
at −
αb2
1− αb2
yt
¸
=
c1πt
β
− κc1yt
β
+
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at −
κc1αb2
β(1− αb2)
yt
=
µ
−κc1
β
− κc1αb2
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt +
c1πt
β
+
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
=
µ
−κc1(1− αb2)− κc1αb2
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt +
c1πt
β
+
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
=
µ
−κc1 + κc1αb2 − κc1αb2
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt +
c1πt
β
+
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
=
µ
−κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt +
c1πt
β
+
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
Plug into the whole thing:
µ
1− αb2 + c2α
1− αb2
¶
Etyt+1 =
µ
(1− αb2)(1 + c1φx + αc2) + c1φxαb2 + α2c2b2
1− αb2
¶
yt + c1φππt
−c1φxb1 + αc2b1
1− αb2
at +
µ
κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt −
c1πt
β
− κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
Focus on the terms in yt :
µ
β(1− αb2)(1 + c1φx + αc2) + βc1φxαb2 + βα2c2b2 + κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt
µ
(β − βαb2)(1 + c1φx + αc2) + βc1φxαb2 + βα2c2b2 + κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
ytµ
β + βc1φx + βαc2 − βαb2 − βαb2c1φx − βα2b2c2 + βc1φxαb2 + βα2c2b2 + κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
ytµ
β + βc1φx + βαc2 − βαb2 + κc1
β(1− αb2)
¶
yt
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Focusing on the terms in at :
−c1φxb1 + αc2b1
1− αb2
at −
κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at =
−βc1φxb1 − βαc2b1 − κc1b1
β(1− αb2)
at
Focusing on the terms in πt :
c1φππt −
c1πt
β
= (c1φπ − c1β−1)πt
Putting everything in:
Etyt+1 =
µ
1 +
βc1φx + κc1
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
yt+
µ
c1(βφπ − 1)(1− αb2)
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
πt+
µ
−c1b1(βφx + κ)− βαc2b1
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
at
11 Second equation.
Take 60:
Etπt+1 =
πt − κ(yt − y∗t )
β
Etπt+1 = β
−1πt − κβ−1yt + κβ−1y∗t
Use the expression for potential output:
Etπt+1 = β−1πt − κβ−1yt + κβ−1
µ
b1
(1− αb2)
at −
αb2
1− αb2
yt
¶
Etπt+1 = β−1πt − κβ−1yt +
κβ−1b1
(1− αb2)
at −
κβ−1αb2
1− αb2
yt
Etπt+1 = β−1πt −
κβ−1(1− αb2) + κβ−1αb2
1− αb2
yt +
κβ−1b1
(1− αb2)
at
Etπt+1 = β−1πt −
κβ−1 − κβ−1αb2 + κβ−1αb2
1− αb2
yt +
κβ−1b1
(1− αb2)
at
Etπt+1 = β−1πt −
κ
β(1− αb2)
yt +
κb1
β(1− αb2)
at
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So the system is:
Etyt+1 =
µ
1 +
c1(βφx + κ)
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
yt +
µ
c1(βφπ − 1)(1− αb2)
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
¶
πt +
µ
−c1b1(βφx + κ)− βαc2b
β(1− αb2 + c2α)
Etπt+1 = −
κ
β(1− αb2)
yt + β−1πt +
κb1
β(1− αb2)
at
12 Appendix B - the system for analysis on output
gap
The system is in the form:
AEtYt+1 = BYt + CXt
with the vector Ytbeing:
Yt = [yt, πt, y
∗
t , xt, gt, it−1, at−1]
The system in a convenient form is:
Etyt+1 +
C¯
Y¯
ΦEtπt+1 −
∙
G¯+ C¯ Ω
Y¯
¸
Etgt+1 −
C¯
Y¯
Φit = yt −
∙
G¯+ C¯ Ω
Y¯
¸
gt
βEtπt+1 = πt − kxt
it = φiit−1 + φππt + φxxt
γn + 1
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
at = y∗t −
∙
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν G¯
C¯ − γ(1− θ)
³
G
C˜
´ ν−1
ν
¸
µ
γθ
³
C
C˜
´ ν−1
ν Y¯
C¯
+ γn
¶ gt
0 = gt + αxt − εt
at = ρat−1 + εt
0 = xt − yt + y∗t
In matrix form:
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 C¯Y¯ Φ 0 0 −
h
G¯+C¯ Ω
Y¯
i
− C¯Y¯ Φ 0
0 β 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 γn+1
γθ

C
C˜
 ν−1
ν Y¯
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